By Dahiru Yusuf Yabo
The campaign for State Police is gaining momentum across Nigeria. Supporters present it as the long-awaited solution to insecurity, arguing that local control will improve intelligence gathering, speed up response times, strengthen community policing, and deepen federalism.
While these arguments appear persuasive, they ignore a critical reality that Nigerians cannot afford to overlook.
Before entrusting governors with armed police institutions, we must first ask a fundamental question: What have state governors done with the powers they already possess?
The answer is visible in the tragic history of State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs).
For more than two decades, SIECs have become symbols of democratic failure.
Instead of serving as independent electoral bodies, they have largely functioned as extensions of state governments.
Across the country, local government elections conducted by SIECs routinely produce unbelievable outcomes in which ruling parties sweep virtually every available seat.
Opposition parties rarely win. Results are often predictable long before voting begins. Entire local government councils are allocated to governors’ political parties through elections that many citizens no longer regard as credible.
Today, few Nigerians genuinely believe that SIECs are independent. Fewer still believe that governors do not exercise substantial influence over them.
Yet, we are now being asked to believe that the same political class that captured SIECs will suddenly respect the operational independence of State Police.
Such optimism is not supported by either logic or experience.
A governor who already controls state resources, dominates the State Assembly, influences traditional institutions, and exercises enormous political power will naturally seek influence over any police structure operating within the state.
Constitutional safeguards may look impressive on paper, but Nigeria’s political reality often tells a different story.
The Constitution guarantees local government autonomy, separation of powers, and institutional independence. Yet these provisions are frequently undermined in practice.
Why should State Police be immune from similar political interference?
The dangers are neither imaginary nor exaggerated.
A politically controlled State Police could easily become an instrument for: Harassing political opponents;
Suppressing dissenting voices;
Intimidating voters during elections;
Selective prosecution of perceived enemies; Ethnic or religious profiling;
Political vendettas disguised as law enforcement.
In such circumstances, State Police would not enhance security. Instead, it could institutionalise insecurity for anyone outside the ruling political establishment.
Beyond political concerns lies an equally serious challenge: funding.
Many states already struggle to pay salaries, pensions, gratuities, and other basic obligations.
If several states find it difficult to adequately fund education and healthcare, how will they finance a professional police service that requires advanced intelligence capabilities, forensic laboratories, surveillance technology, communications infrastructure, modern equipment, and continuous personnel training?
An underfunded police force does not improve security. It creates fertile ground for corruption, abuse, and inefficiency.
More importantly, Nigeria’s insecurity cannot be explained solely by police centralisation.
The country’s security challenges stem largely from weak intelligence systems, porous borders, corruption, poor governance, political interference, judicial delays, and the absence of a modern security architecture.
Creating State Police without addressing these underlying problems risks decentralising existing weaknesses rather than solving them.
The experience of SIECs should therefore serve as a cautionary lesson.
The same governors who transformed supposedly independent electoral commissions into political instruments cannot automatically be trusted with armed security institutions without extraordinary checks and balances.
Nigeria must be careful not to repeat with guns what it has already failed with ballot papers.
If SIECs became tools for manufacturing electoral victories, State Police could become tools for manufacturing political obedience.
Democracy may survive a compromised electoral commission.
It may not survive thirty-six politically controlled police forces. That is not federalism. That is the decentralisation of coercive power.
History consistently shows that whenever coercion becomes localised and partisan, liberty is often the first casualty.
Nigeria should proceed with extreme caution.
Dahiru Yusuf Yabo, PGD-CMPC, MCM & MPPA, is a Political and Security Analyst.